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‘The nature of the present international environment, 
in which the NPT faces increasing threats from 
several sources, makes it essential to continue to 
strengthen the safeguards system envisaged when 
+ was launched a decade ago. This is a complex 
and difficult task, but it is vital to continued 
credible verification of compliance with the NPT 
and to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime 
as a whole. It will require concerted and sustained 
efforts on the part of the IAEA, supportive states 
and concerned non-governmental groups’ 
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large number of states parties— out of 
—have not yet met this requirement. 
 Under such safeguards agreements, non-
nuclear weapon states parties declare to the 
 their nuclear facilities (which, by defini-
tion, are assumed to be for peaceful purposes) 
and inventories of all nuclear materials. 
States are required to update this informa-
tion annually, based on the model provided 
in a   document, / 
(Corrected). The nuclear facilities and 
material inventories detailed in these confiden-
tial declarations will be subject to verification 
(‘safeguarded’) by the . Safeguards 
agreements provide for the application by 
the  of specified active and passive 
verification measures. 
 Full-scope safeguards employ a quantitative 
approach in seeking to provide a reasonable 
level of assurance of the timely detection of 
the diversion of a ‘significant quantity’ of 
nuclear materials for the production of 
nuclear weapons. They focus on the accoun-
tancy and control of nuclear materials, and 
are applicable to all stages of the civilian 
nuclear ‘life cycle’, with the exception of 
mining and ore processing. The  con-
firms that full quantities of declared nuclear 
materials remain at safeguarded sites or can 
otherwise be accounted for. The ’s verifi-
cation armoury includes active measures like 
routine on-site inspections (s) and passive 
‘containment and surveillance’ measures, 
such as the use of tamper-resistant seals and 
surveillance cameras at nuclear facilities. 
Shortcomings of classical safeguards
While classical safeguards were considered 
adequate when introduced in the s, the 
passage of time has revealed a number of 
serious shortcomings. The most fundamen-
tal was that the  could only inspect or 
monitor materials and facilities formally 
declared to it by states parties. This provided 
would-be proliferators with the latitude to 
develop substantial undeclared nuclear 
capabilities undetected, either co-located 
with declared facilities or completely sepa-
rate. While a so-called special inspection 
(the equivalent of a ‘challenge’ inspection 
in other disarmament regimes) could be 
Introduction
Ten years after the International Atomic 
Energy Agency () launched the ‘+’ 
programme to strengthen its nuclear safe-
guards system, it is possible only to report 
mixed success. The initiative was prompted 
by anxiety about the efficacy of traditional 
safeguards following the discovery that  Iraq 
had a nuclear weapons programme prior to 
its defeat in the Gulf War of –, and 
by ongoing concerns about North Korea’s 
nuclear programme.
 While certain aspects of safeguards have 
improved as a result of the ’s own efforts, 
the adoption by states of Additional Protocols 
to strengthen safeguards further has pro-
ceeded much slower than expected. The 
introduction of strengthened safeguards has 
been complicated by the need to balance 
comprehensiveness and intrusiveness with 
political acceptability and financial and tech-
nical practicality. Suspect nuclear activities 
revealed more recently in states like Iran and 
Libya, the emergence of non-traditional 
‘secondary’ nuclear suppliers, such as Pakistan, 
and post- September fears about nuclear 
smuggling have reinforced the continuing 
need to improve nuclear safeguards. 
 This Brief assesses progress in strengthening 
the ’s safeguards system and examines 
how obstacles to the acceptance and imple-
mentation of strengthened safeguards might 
be overcome. 
The ‘classical’ safeguards system
Nuclear safeguards constitute the chief means 
of verifying compliance with the  
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (). 
These full-scope or ‘classical’ safeguards, 
as they are also known, seek to ensure that 
civilian nuclear industries in non-nuclear 
weapon states do not provide a cover for 
nuclear weapons programmes. Each state 
party to the  is required by the treaty to 
conclude a ‘comprehensive safeguards agree-
ment’ with the  to facilitate verification 
by the Agency of the state’s compliance with 
its treaty obligations. However, a surprisingly 
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. The IAEA defines nuclear safeguards 
as ‘technical means used to verify 
that a State’s nuclear activities are 
in conformity with the undertakings 
that the State has given about the 
nature and scope of these activities’ 
(IAEA, The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, 
International Nuclear Verification 
Series, no. , Vienna, Austria, , 
p. ). 
. Mohamed ElBaradei, ‘Introductory 
Statement to the Board of Governors’, 
 June , www.iaea.org/world 
atom/press/statements//ebsp 
n.shtml.
. See ‘The structure and content of 
agreements between the Agency and 
states required in connection with 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons’, INFCIRC/ 
(Corrected), IAEA, Vienna, June . 
. The IAEA defines a ‘significant 
quantity’ as eight kilograms of 
plutonium and uranium-,  
kilograms of uranium- enriched 
to  per cent or more,  kilograms 
of uranium- enriched to less than 
 per cent,  tonnes of natural 
uranium and  tonnes of depleted 
uranium and thorium (IAEA, The 
Evolution of IAEA Safeguards, p. ).
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requested in cases where there was strong 
suspicion of malfeasance, political expediency 
meant that these were almost impossible 
to initiate. The  Board of Governors 
has only invoked this right once, in , 
in regard to North Korea, which refused to 
accept such an inspection. 
 A second limitation concerns the peaceful 
nuclear activities that states are allowed to 
undertake under the . Article  permits 
states to assemble many of the elements of 
a future nuclear weapons programme, such 
as a uranium enrichment capability, as long 
as they declare them as being for peaceful 
purposes and subject them to safeguards. 
This provides proliferation-minded states 
with the scope to violate the spirit of the 
treaty without breaching its letter. Having 
mastered all of the relevant technologies, 
such a country can legally give notice of its 
withdrawal from the  and begin to 
produce nuclear weapons perfectly legally. 
This is what North Korea attempted to 
do, although it failed to declare significant 
activities. This underlined the need for more 
effective safeguards in respect of legitimate 
nuclear activities. 
 A third weakness of classical safeguards 
stemmed from the desire to avoid discrimi-
nating against particular states parties, 
regardless of the risk that they may contra-
vene their treaty obligations. To date, the 
 has applied its verification resources 
largely on a proportional basis: the amount 
of monitoring and the number of inspections 
that a state party is subject to has depended 
on the quantity of nuclear material that it 
possesses. This has led to the expenditure of 
considerable resources on verifying states 
with large, well-developed nuclear industries, 
like Canada, that are not of proliferation 
concern, while distracting attention from 
those that are, such as Iran. 
Enter strengthened safeguards
Interest in strengthening the safeguards 
system arose in the mid-s, when the 
’s Standing Advisory Group on Safe-
guards Implementation () began to 
explore how to enhance safeguards within the 
confines of a limited budget. This occurred 
in the context of the prevailing ‘zero real 
growth’ budget environment. Much greater 
urgency was attached to the issue after 
inspections by the United Nations Special 
Commission (), beginning in , 
revealed that Iraq’s illicit nuclear weapons 
programme had circumvented  safeguards.
 In December  the  launched the 
‘+’ programme, mandating the  
Secretariat to examine the legal, technical and 
financial aspects of strengthened safeguards 
and to propose enhanced and more efficient 
safeguards to the Board of Governors. The 
immediate result was two major initiatives. 
Part  involved safeguards enhancements 
that could be initiated by the  within 
the scope of its existing mandate and legal 
authority, while Part  comprised measures 
that would be possible only by establishing 
a stronger legal basis for the Agency to act. 
Part  measures evolved into the Additional 
Protocol. Later the  inaugurated a pro-
gramme to develop ‘integrated safeguards’, 
which focuses on rationalising strengthened 
safeguards as applied to individual countries, 
thereby reducing the verification burden 
and costs. 
 Strengthened safeguards are a vast improve-
ment on classical safeguards. They are 
qualitatively different in that they provide 
a fortified legal foundation for the ’s 
efforts to develop a complete picture of each 
state party’s nuclear activities. This facilitates 
its objective to ‘provide credible assurance 
not only about declared nuclear material 
in a State but also about the absence of un-
declared nuclear material and activities’. 
IAEA initiatives under its existing authority
The  began in  to introduce safe-
guards enhancements that fell within the 
scope of its existing legal authority, which it 
applies to all states with full-scope safeguards 
agreements. These Part  measures include 
requesting additional information on facilities 
that formerly contained nuclear materials 
subject to safeguards but no longer do so, 
or which are expected to do so in future, 
increasing the level of remote monitoring of 
. See INFCIRC/ (Corrected), p. . 
States parties recognised as nuclear 
weapon states by the NPT are not 
required to accept safeguards on 
their civilian nuclear industries, but 
all have made ‘voluntary offers’, 
accepting safeguards on certain 
facilities as a token of goodwill.
. See Suzanna van Moyland, ‘The 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
Additional Protocol’, VERTIC Briefing 
Paper, no. /, VERTIC, London, . 
. Victor Bragin, John Carlson and 
Russell Leslie, ‘Integrated safeguards: 
status and trends’, The Nonproliferation 
Review, summer , p. .
. For an overview of the background 
to, and early development of, the 
NPT’s strengthened safeguards 
system, including a chronology of 
major developments, see Oliver Meier, 
‘Fulfilling the NPT: strengthened 
nuclear safeguards’, VERTIC Briefing 
Paper, no. /, VERTIC, London, 
April .
. IAEA Director General Mohamed 
ElBaradei, quoted in ‘Non-prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements 
and Additional Protocols’, IAEA, Vienna, 
, p. .
‘To date, the IAEA 
has applied its 
verification 
resources largely 
on a proportional 
basis: the amount 
of monitoring 
and the number 
of inspections 
that a state party 
is subject to has 
depended on 
the quantity of 
nuclear material 
that it possesses’ 
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movements of nuclear material, expanding 
the use of unannounced inspections and 
collecting environmental samples at sites 
to which the Agency already has access. 
These efforts have been aided by the greater 
use of open source information, including 
satellite imagery, as well as by intelligence 
provided to the  by third parties and the 
increased information supplied by states 
parties themselves, as required under the 
Additional Protocol.
Additional Protocols
In May  the Board of Governors agreed 
a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards 
Agreements to supplement full-scope safe-
guards. States parties are encouraged to 
conclude and bring into force an Additional 
Protocol to their existing safeguards agree-
ment under which they accept more stringent 
reporting and verification measures. 
 The Additional Protocol sets a much higher 
standard for safeguards and greatly expands 
the ’s verification responsibilities. It 
provides for increased transparency by exten-
ding states parties’ declaration, reporting 
and site access obligations to previously 
exempt portions of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
The protocol encompasses the entire range 
of activities associated with the life cycle of 
states parties’ nuclear industries. This stretches 
all the way from nuclear mining and pro-
cessing to the storage of nuclear waste, inclu-
ding the activities of private firms involved 
in the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as any sites 
that house nuclear material intended for non-
nuclear purposes. The Additional Protocol 
also requires states parties to report on the 
production of nuclear-related equipment, 
nuclear-related imports and exports, nuclear 
fuel cycle-related research and development, 
and future plans for nuclear facilities. This 
enables the  to develop a much more 
comprehensive ‘cradle-to-grave’ picture of 
states parties’ nuclear activities.
 The Additional Protocol similarly expands 
the ’s rights to conduct inspections of 
states parties’ nuclear industries, most impor-
tantly through ‘complementary access’. This 
permits the Agency to inspect any part of 
a declared nuclear facility, instead of only 
designated ‘strategic points’ that were access-
ible under full-scope safeguards. This can 
also be applied to nuclear-related sites, such 
as those that use unsafeguarded nuclear 
materials. Complementary access may be 
coupled with short-notice access to all facili-
ties at a nuclear site and with the possibility 
of collecting environmental samples outside 
declared locations when the  deems 
this necessary. 
 The Additional Protocol increases the ’s 
capacity to ensure that states parties’ declara-
tions are complete, as well as significantly 
improving its prospects for detecting unde-
clared nuclear material and activities. This 
offers a vastly improved basis for deterring 
prohibited activities and greatly reduces the 
potential for establishing an independent 
weapons-related nuclear fuel cycle. 
Integrated safeguards
The increased burden in regard to finance 
and labour that accompanies the expansion 
of activity associated with strengthened safe-
guards, including the schedule of inspections 
possible under Additional Protocols, repre-
sents a potential obstacle to the implementa-
tion of strengthened safeguards. Integrated 
safeguards seek to allow this enlarged verifi-
cation burden to be borne with substantially 
fewer resources than would otherwise be the 
case. They aim to accomplish this apparent 
miracle by enhancing the efficiency of safe-
guards overall and in relation to particular 
states, thereby enabling the Agency to focus 
its efforts where they are needed most. The 
conceptual framework for integrated safe-
guards was completed in March , and 
the development of practical approaches to 
the framework’s implementation is ongoing.
 Integrated safeguards comprise two distinct 
possibilities. The first involves easing the 
verification burden by decreasing reliance on 
the traditional labour-intensive method of 
using s to verify the accuracy of states 
parties’ data declarations. This is accomplished 
through increased use of remote sensing devi-
ces and automated systems for data evaluation, 
as well as by utilising experience derived from 
the implementation of safeguards to refine 
verification modalities and techniques.
. The IAEA’s Safeguards System: 
Ready for the st Century, IAEA, 
Vienna, , p. . 
. John Carlson, ‘Nuclear safeguards: 
developments and challenges’, in 
Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier 
(eds), Verification Yearbook , 
VERTIC, London, , p. .
. The Additional Protocol is not a 
protocol to the NPT as is often 
incorrectly claimed.
. See INFCIRC/ (Corrected), May 
.
. Carlson, p. .
. For a comprehensive analysis see 
Jill N. Cooley, ‘Integrated nuclear 
safeguards: genesis and evolution’, 
in Trevor Findlay (ed.), Verification 
Yearbook , VERTIC, London, , 
pp. –.
‘The Additional 
Protocol increases 
the IAEA’s 
capacity to 
ensure that 
states parties’ 
declarations are 
complete, as well 
as significantly 
improving its 
prospects for 
detecting 
undeclared 
nuclear material 
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 The second seeks to ‘customise’ verification 
for each individual states party, by identifying 
redundancies and consolidating and rationali-
sing measures applied to it, thereby reducing 
the verification burden for both the state 
and the . This includes minimising the 
effort expended on verifying previously 
verified material, wherever possible. Scope 
for the harmonisation of safeguards in 
particular cases will depend on factors like 
the state party’s nuclear fuel cycle, the rela-
tionship between nuclear facilities, the 
effectiveness of the state’s accounting and 
control system for nuclear materials and 
the ’s ability to conduct unannounced 
inspections successfully. Developing the 
optimal mixture of particular verification 
instruments to be applied in each case enables 
the  to economise in the verification 
of states that are of little or no interest in 
terms of proliferation, while applying more 
rigorous measures in states of greater con-
cern. Strengthened safeguards are much 
more flexible than classical safeguards in 
this respect. 
 Integrated safeguards will, however, only be 
applied to states parties that have negotiated 
and brought into force both a full-scope 
safeguards agreement and an Additional 
Protocol. Both are needed before the Agency 
can identify potential verification synergies. 
There are a number of other conditions that 
also must be met before integrated safeguards 
can be applied to a particular state:
 • it must have complied with its safeguards 
agreement and Additional Protocol in a 
timely manner;
 • it must have had a comprehensive evalu-
ation conducted by the ; 
 • the Agency must have concluded that 
there has been no diversion of declared 
nuclear material; and
 • the  must have been able to implement 
complementary access, if this was necessary, 
and to have found no indications of unde-
clared nuclear activities or materials.
Each state needs to meet these criteria annu-
ally in order for integrated safeguards to be 
applied.
Progress and problems in 
implementation
After a decade of efforts, the record of 
strengthened safeguards remains mixed. 
Enhanced safeguards that fall under the ’s 
existing authority have only slowly supple-
mented classical safeguards. Progress has also 
been slow in terms of the negotiation, signing, 
ratification and entry into force of Additional 
Protocols. As of  April , only   
states parties had signed Additional Protocols, 
and only  of these had brought them into 
force. The introduction of integrated 
safeguards has proceeded even more slowly: 
as of April  they were being implemented 
in only three countries: Australia, Indonesia 
and Norway, all with relatively small nuclear 
programmes. The Agency expects to begin 
implementing integrated safeguards in states 
with much larger programmes in the near 
future, including Canada, Hungary and Japan.
 The failure of particular nations to adopt 
strengthened safeguards does not necessarily 
reflect intent to develop or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons. It may simply result from 
preoccupation with other priorities, legis-
lative or other technical difficulties, political 
or bureaucratic indifference or incompetence 
in the state concerned. Some hold-outs that 
are in full compliance with their existing 
obligations resent being pressed to accept 
increased verification when other countries 
retain nuclear weapons despite being bound 
under Article  of the  to work towards 
their elimination, or when others have 
attempted to acquire nuclear weapon capa-
bilities under cover of safeguards. 
 Among the key  states parties that do 
not yet have Additional Protocols in force 
are all of the nuclear weapon states () 
parties, except China. France, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States 
have all signed but not yet ratified. Iraq 
and North Korea have been found in non-
compliance with both the  and their 
nuclear safeguards agreements and have not 
signed an Additional Protocol, although 
non-compliers Iran and Libya have now 
done so. India, Israel, Pakistan and now 
North Korea are all outside of the  and 
its comprehensive safeguards regime.
. For a more detailed account of 
the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards 
initiatives see Bragin, Carlson and 
Leslie, pp. –.
. ‘Strengthening the effectiveness 
and improving the efficiency of the 
safeguards system and application 
of the Model Additional Protocol’, 
IAEA document GC()/,  August 
, p. . 
. Carlson, p. .
. See www.iaea.org/worldatom/
programmes/safeguards/sg.protocol. 
shtml.
. ‘Statement to the forty-seventh 
regular session of the IAEA General 
Conference  by IAEA Director-
General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei’,  
September , www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/Statements//
ebspn.html.
. The entry into force of British 
and French Additional Protocols is 
dependent on all of the members 
of the European Union (EU) being in 
a position to do so simultaneously. 
When this happens it will boost the 
total number of Additional Protocols 
by at least  in one go.
. The US Senate unanimously 
approved ratification of the US 
Additional Protocol on  March , 
but Congress must pass national 
implementing legislation before it 
can enter into force.
‘Some hold-outs 
that are in full 
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obligations resent 
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verification when 
other countries 
retain nuclear 
weapons’
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Increased resource demands
One factor complicating the implementation 
of strengthened safeguards is the increased 
resources required. While integrated safe-
guards were intended to save costs, and still 
promise eventually to do so, their introduc-
tion necessitates an initial investment of 
time and resources. At the same time, the 
verification demands on the  have 
been heightened by the placing under  
supervision of considerable quantities of 
fissile material and numbers of nuclear 
facilities in the Soviet successor states. Many 
of these are verification-intensive due to 
their former military nature and sensitivity. 
In addition the Agency has been involved 
in crucial verification activities in Iraq, Iran 
and now Libya.
The danger of discrimination
The option of directing verification efforts 
toward states parties of particular proliferation 
concern, made possible under the strength-
ened safeguards system, is not without its 
prospective hazards. Singling out individual 
states may be perceived as unfair discrimi-
nation and create a backlash, especially among 
non-aligned nations that already suspect the 
motives of the Western states that have been 
pressing them to accept strengthened safe-
guards. Many are concerned about the ineq-
uitable nature of the nonproliferation regime, 
as enshrined in the . This group includes 
a number of the countries that have the 
greatest potential for nuclear proliferation. 
Official indifference
The failure of some states to accept strength-
ened safeguards and the slow rate of progress 
made by others towards introducing them 
often seem to result from a lack of concern 
about nuclear proliferation and ignorance 
of the importance of strengthened safe-
guards. This is most common among states 
that have relatively minor nuclear activities 
and are preoccupied with more pressing 
developmental tasks. These countries 
probably do not harbour nuclear ambitions, 
peaceful or otherwise, but their unwilling-
ness to agree to strengthened safeguards sends 
an unfortunate signal regarding the value 
of the  and the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime in general. It may also leave them 
vulnerable to unregulated and even unde-
tected nuclear activities being conducted on 
their territory, including nuclear smuggling. 
Recognition of this problem has led the 
 to develop a Small Quantities Protocol, 
which involves simplified procedures for 
states that have no nuclear material or 
limited amounts of it to report. 
Resistance to transparency and intrusiveness
There is definite resistance to the introduction 
of strengthened safeguards by states con-
cerned about the much higher degree of 
transparency and intrusiveness involved. 
This is particularly evident on the part of 
the nuclear weapon states themselves. In 
addition to excluding all of their weapon-
related nuclear activities from strengthened 
safeguards (as in the case of traditional safe-
guards), they have offered little, if anything, 
in the way of expanded voluntary safeguards 
on their peaceful nuclear activities. Although 
this is not required under the Additional 
Protocol, this nevertheless sets a negative 
example to the non-nuclear weapon states, 
potentially discouraging them from support-
ing strengthened safeguards. It also reinforces 
suspicions that the  have no intention 
of ever abandoning their nuclear arsenals. 
Advancing strengthened 
safeguards
The , supported by concerned states 
parties, is working to remove the barriers 
hindering efforts to strengthen the ’s 
verification regime. This has included an 
active campaign to convince states of the 
value of strengthened safeguards and to 
encourage them to adopt Additional Proto-
cols as soon as possible. The  has, to this 
end, organised regional and other confer-
ences, often with encouraging results in 
terms of the number of nations commencing 
. See ‘International response: IAEA 
needs budget boost, officials say’, 
Global Security Newswire,  February 
, www.nti.org. See also Carlson, 
p. .
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negotiations on an Additional Protocol and/
or comprehensive safeguards agreement.
 Overcoming the obstacles confronting 
efforts to strengthen the  safeguards 
system will not be easy, but there are a 
number of additional useful approaches that 
should be pursued. 
Tackling perceived discrimination
Altering the perception on the part of some 
states that the  and its safeguards system 
discriminate against them will be crucial to 
gaining their support. One approach, 
although obviously one with cost implica-
tions, is to apply gradually increased safe-
guards to all of the peaceful nuclear activities 
of the nuclear weapon states. The overall 
tone of discrimination that hangs over the 
 could be more readily dissipated if the 
 moved faster towards nuclear disarma-
ment as required under Article . Such 
states, particularly the , cannot relentlessly 
seek to impose greater restrictions on the 
nuclear options of other nations without 
foregoing some options themselves.
Increased funding
The  has recently seen its verification 
budget boosted, with strong  support, after 
a decade of zero budgeting. The substantial 
increase will enable the Agency to fund its 
safeguards activities without resort to supple-
mental funding, as in recent years. This will 
also provide an improved financial basis for 
expanding the application of strengthened 
safeguards to increasing numbers of states 
as they adopt Additional Protocols and will 
hasten the advance of integrated safeguards. 
Existing funding levels should be further 
increased: from the perspective of spending 
on nuclear weapons, nuclear safeguards are 
a security bargain. 
New restraints on fissionable material 
production
In December , the  Director General, 
Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, in his annual report 
to the United Nations General Assembly, 
argued that the only way, ultimately, to 
prevent non-nuclear weapon states from 
illicitly acquiring their own plutonium and 
high enriched uranium for weapons pur-
poses, whether under putatively peaceful 
and safeguarded programmes or otherwise, 
is to restrict enrichment and reprocessing 
activities by individual states. He suggested 
examining the merits of producing fission-
able materials multilaterally in a limited 
number of locations. These ventures would 
be under safeguards and would supply 
nuclear materials, also under safeguards, for 
peaceful purposes. This proposal deserves 
serious consideration, although there are a 
host of political, economic and technical 
issues that will need to be addressed before 
it could bear fruit. 
Conclusion
The nature of the present international envi-
ronment, in which the  faces increasing 
threats from several sources, makes it essential 
to continue to strengthen the safeguards 
system envisaged when + was launched a 
decade ago. This is a complex and difficult 
task, but it is vital to continued credible 
verification of compliance with the  and 
to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime 
as a whole. It will require concerted and 
sustained efforts on the part of the , 
supportive states and concerned non-govern-
mental groups. 
 Paradoxically, the recent cases of Iran and 
Libya may hasten the advance of strength-
ened safeguards. Both have already agreed 
to sign and implement an Additional 
Protocol and post-occupation Iraq will be 
strongly enjoined to follow suit. If and when 
North Korea rejoins the nonproliferation 
regime, the resulting verification package 
is likely to include an Additional Protocol, 
among other strengthened measures. All of 
this will expand the ’s experience in 
the application of strengthened safeguards 
to the ‘hard cases’ and should build momen-
tum among the ’s law-abiding states 
parties to strengthen the safeguards regime 
further, both individually and collectively. 
. See Mohamed ElBaradei, 
‘Strengthening the nuclear non-
proliferation regime: an international 
priority’, IAEA news release, Vienna, 
 December . 
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